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It is now commonplace to note that the scope of ‘security’ has broadened and deepened considerably since the Cold War. The range of phenomena considered by states as security issues has expanded from military and strategic matters to include a host of new problems, including transnational diseases, crime, piracy, environmental degradation, and flows of illegal migrants and narcotics, to name but a few. These issues are often described as qualitatively or quantitatively ‘new’ and linked to ‘globalisation’, which has supposedly made states more susceptible to such challenges and less capable of tackling them in isolation. Correspondingly, in some parts of the world, this discourse has been accompanied by a significant expansion in international cooperation designed to govern these new issues at the regional or even global level. The academic subfield of security studies has grown commensurately to analyse this expansion of discourse and practice. The Copenhagen School’s (CS) ‘securitisation’ approach, which explores how issues become discursively identified as new security ‘threats’, has become particularly influential (Buzan et al., 1998).
Southeast Asia is often said to be host to a forbidding array of new security challenges. In particular, the region is said to be ‘imperilled’ by ‘transnational’ threats such as natural disasters, migration, climate change, environmental degradation, epidemic diseases, terrorism, transnational crime and drug trafficking (Dupont, 2001; Caballero-Anthony et al., 2006). However, while regional states’ official discourse appears to follow the global trend of recognising and securitising these challenges, analysts often observe that the practical action required to tackle them – whether regionally, bilaterally or unilaterally – is rarely forthcoming. The main regional body, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has certainly issued declarations identifying problems like transnational crime and diseases as serious threats to security. However, securitisation theorists report that this discourse has only created the ‘illusion of progress’, arguing that there is little evidence that states are ‘going beyond the rhetoric of securitisation to deeper institutionalisation’ (Emmers, 2003: 430; Caballero-Anthony, 2008a). The ASEAN Regional Forum, which is specifically devoted to enhancing security at the pan-regional level, is also widely seen as ineffective, having failed to progress beyond banal ‘confidence-building measures’ (Jones and Smith, 2007).
Securitisation theorists struggle to explain this significant gap between security discourse and practice. From their theoretical perspective, political leaders deploy discourses of existential ‘threat’ are used in order to broaden the scope of ‘security’, to legitimise raiseing issues above the usual level of political contestation in order to sanction theand enable the use of resources and extraordinary resources and measures to deal with them (Buzan et al., 1998: ch. 2). This perspective makes it difficult to explain instances where issues are discursively identified as a threat, yet little or no resources or measures are deployed against them. CS scholars working on Southeast Asia therefore tend to fall back onrefer to ASEAN’s principle of non-interference in member-states’ internal affairs to explain the lack of substantive regional cooperation. This norm, supposedly ‘the single most important principle underpinning ASEAN regionalism’ (Acharya, 2001: 57), is said to block meaningful action being taken on all manner of domestic and transnational problems, such as the consequences of military misrule in Burma, humanitarian crises, piracy, transnational crime, infectious diseases, and so on (Rahim, 2008: 70; McDougall, 2001: 168; Emmers, 2003: 433; Caballero-Anthony, 2008a: 522). This implies that states do see these issues as threats but cannot act against them due to the increasingly anachronistic norm of state sovereignty.
This argument is not, however, particularly persuasive. ‘Non-interference’ has been violated on countless occasions to further powerful interests in Southeast Asian societies. Violations include the cross-border sponsorship of guerrilla movements, the invasion of East Timor in 1975 and humanitarian intervention there in 1999, membership conditionality for Cambodia, and attempts to promote political liberalisation in Burma (Jones, 2010). ASEAN states have also engaged in very concrete multi- and bilateral cooperation against transnational security threats, including military and diplomatic assistance against cross-border insurgent movements and separatist struggles such as the one in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines (Antolik, 1990: 22, 53-60, 77-81). Southeast Asian governments have also weakened their sovereignty to pursue economic growth, empowering multinational corporations to effectively govern parts of their territories, and establishing regional mechanisms to monitor and regulate national monetary policies (Ong, 2000; Nesadurai, 2009). Southeast Asian states’ adherence to sovereignty and non-interference is thus selective, rather than uniform. It demands an explanation in its own right, rather than providing a catch-all explanation for state inaction. 
	Rather than blaming international norms, this paper advances a deeper explanation of the scope of regional security policy, suggesting that which phenomena count as security issues and how they are governed is strongly influenced by domestic social conflict. Rather than seeing states as unitary actors responding to or securitising threats, I argue that we should analyse the way in which potential security issues are viewed by different societal forces operating upon and within the state, and to understand security policy as the outcome of power struggles between these forces. Different societal groups always evaluate potential security issues in relation to their own interests, ideologies and strategies. Because these vary, there is unlikely to ever be unanimous agreement on the content of security policy. One social group may perceive and discursively identify something as ‘threatening’, while others may be indifferent or even view the issue positively. Particularly since the content of security policy has profound consequences for the way that state power is exercised, socio-political groups will push for policies that further their own agendas, potentially clashing against one another. This social conflict powerfully shapes both the policies states adopt and state practice – which may diverge considerably, as social groups opposed to official policies may thwart or pervert their implementation. Some state officials may discursively securitise an issue, yet be powerless to take decisive action due to resistance by more powerful forces within or outside the state apparatus. From this perspective, the scope of security policy is best explained by assessing the relationship between specific issues and the power, resources, and strategies of socio-political forces, the conflicts and compromises between them, and the opportunities afforded to them by state forms.
	The paper proceeds in three subsequent sections. Section two develops an analytical framework for understanding security policy. It argues that the distinctive nature of state power in Southeast Asia, whereby states are often captured or dominated by dominant social forces, particularly illiberal capitalist elites and their allies, profoundly shapes how governments identify and respond to security threats. Section three illustrates this argument with an extended case study of regional policies towards Burma (Myanmar). This shows that while some social groups identify the externalities of military rule there as ‘threats’, more powerful elements see them as lucrative opportunities and resist securitising them. The actual policy which has emerged is the result of conflicts and compromises between these forces, which play out at both the domestic and transnational levels. Section four briefly shows how the framework can be applied to other security issues, touching on the environment and border conflicts.


2. Security Policy and Social Conflict

This section provides a framework to analyse security policy via a critique of the influential CS approach. For many years, security studies were dominated by realist approaches, which remain highly influential today. Realists typically depict security threats and resultant insecurity as material, objective phenomena arising from the unequal power capabilities of states under conditions of international anarchy (Waltz, 1979). However, since the late 1980s, a range of new critical and constructivist approaches have emerged to challenge realism, which can be loosely grouped into the Aberystwyth, Copenhagen and Paris Schools (Waever, 2004). These new approaches have made a major contribution to security studies by debunking the objective qualities of ‘security’, underlineding its the ‘essentially contested’ nature, of security and enhanceding our understanding of the concept and its political uses (Smith, 1999). Below I outline their distinctive contributions. I focus in particular on the CS’s ‘securitisation’ approach, which has arguably become the most widely-applied theoretical framework, particularly in Southeast Asia and with respect to ‘non-traditional’ security issues. I argue that while it opens the way to grasping the way in which security policies are politically produced, it does not go far enough in rejecting realism’s state-centrism and statism. Statist theory is unable to account for why some issues are securitised over others because it neglects political contestation and the social and economic contexts of policy formation. An alternative approach is advanced, building on a particular branch of state theory, and fleshed out with examples drawn from Southeast Asia. 
Broadly speaking, there are two contrasting strands in contemporary security studies that seek to transcend the previously dominant realist approach. The first strand, represented by the Aberystwyth school (also known as critical security studies) critiques realism by decentring the state from our analysis of security and insecurity, insisting that we should be concerned more with the insecurity of people than that of states. The Aberystwyth School maintains realism’s belief that there are real, objective threats ‘out there’, but emphasises threats to ‘human security’ that are overlooked or even exacerbated by a narrow focus on ‘national security’ (Booth, 1991; Wyn Jones, 1999). At the heart of this approach is a normative agenda that advocates changes in policy to make ‘security’ work for the weak and oppressed.
By contrast, the second strand in contemporary security studies, represented by the Copenhagen and Paris Schools, uses a constructivist, anti-foundationalist methodology. From a constructivist perspective, security threats are not objectively given but are constructed through the production of intersubjective understandings of an object as ‘threatening’ to some referent object. The CS has elaborated a detailed account of how this occurs, arguing that securitising actors – typically understood as state elites – strategically identify issues as ‘threats’ through discursive ‘speech acts’ in order to persuade political audiences to legitimise the suspension of normal politics and mobilise extraordinary measures and resources to deal with the issue (Waever, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998). The Paris School’s related but distinct, Foucauldian approach focuses on how professional networks of security agencies and experts work to define threats and risks through the nexus of power and knowledge (CASE Collective, 2006; Huysmans, 2006; Bigo, 2008). 
Arguably, by far the most influential of the three new ‘schools’ is the CS’s ‘securitisation’ approach. This is certainly true in scholarship on Southeast Asia:. wWhile the other schools have made few inroads (cf. Tan, 2007), the concept of ‘securitisation’ is regularly deployed by analysts of ‘non-traditional’ security issues, even by scholars situated in the realist tradition (e.g. Emmers, 2003; Collins, 2003; Caballero-Anthony et al., 2006; Caballero-Anthony, 2008a). However, deploying securitisation theory to this region reveals a number of significant shortcomings in the CS approach. First, as noted above, there is a stark gap between security discourse and practice vis-à-vis many non-traditional ‘threats’. This is highly problematic for a theory that assumes can only baffle theorists who assume that security discourse is crafted precisely in order to mobilise resources for radical emergency actions. A second, related weakness is that securitisation theorists do not and cannot explain why some issues are discursively securitised while others are not. The primary value of the CS approach is its emphasis on how securitisation advances particular agendas by suspending the normal rules of politics. However, rather than proceeding to investigate the wider power struggles in which securitisation is therefore logically implicated, CS theorists focus almost exclusively on the discursive ‘speech act’ of securitisation itself – an approach favoured even by their post-structuralist critics (McDonald, 2008). CS theorists have analysed policymakers’ ‘securitising moves’ and elaborated some of the ‘facilitating conditions’ that enable them to persuade their ‘audience’ (Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Waever, 2003). However, this achieves little more than to describe the process by which an issue becomes securitised; it does not explain why one issue is selected over another or why it is governed (or not) in a particular way. To do so would require connecting security policies to specific domestic interests and considering how social, economic and political forces constrain or enable particular security policies. However, securitisation theorists have so failed to genuinely open up the ‘black box’ of the state, depriving themselves of vital explanatory resources.​[2]​
Consider an example provided by Mely Caballero-Anthony, the leading scholar of non-traditional security in Southeast Asia and secretary-general of the Consortium on Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia. Analysing the securitisation of the issue of poverty in the region, Caballero-Anthony notes that, rather than enhancing ‘human security’, this has been accomplished in a way that has instead enhanced regime security and solidified the developmental state. Although she notes that this approach was contested by pro-poor groups, she merely observes that ‘opposition was not tolerated’ and ‘government critics were often branded as subversive elements’ and suppressed (2008b: 195). How states were able to do this, why they did so, and on whose behalf they were acting, is left unexplored. There is no systematic attempt to open up the state to understand how one conception of security managed to prevail over another. Instead, the state-centrism of the CS approach is simply reinforced, since it is implicitly assumed that ‘states’ are somehow able to uniformly override the wishes of their own populations, such that ‘the state remains the critical actor’ and ‘securitisation has largely been a state-centric project’ (Caballero-Anthony, 2008b: 195; Emmers and Caballero-Anthony, 2006: 32). The wider societal interests which benefit from authoritarian-developmentalist state structures are thus simply ignored.
To transcend the limitations of ‘securitisation’ theory requires us to reject state-centrism and investigate the socio-political conflicts that define the scope of security policy. The need to look beyond the state at societal interests is in fact already gestured towards in the references CS theorists like Cabellero-Anthony make to ‘regime security’ (i.e., to the stability of a particular set of forces whose interests dominate the state) and ‘government critics’. As the CS itself implies, the meaning of ‘security’ is intensely contested among societal groups precisely because of its implications for the distribution of power and resources among particular political agendas. Different social groups naturally evaluate issues in relation to, and push for policies that advance, their own interests, ideologies and strategies. What emerges in practice is the outcome of conflicts between these opposed forces. Consequently security policies can only be understood as ‘the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within states, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them’ (Lipschutz, 1995: 8). To explain what is and what is not securitised thus requires that we study domestic social conflicts and power relations. This should involve both an analysis of the balance of power between different social groups, conceived of as classes, class fractions, ethno-religious groups, and so on, and the opportunities afforded to them by state forms. 
A useful starting point for the first task is to consider patterns of ownership and control over resources in a society. These patterns imply vast disparities in wealth, status, skills, access to political leaders, and so on, which ‘generate significant inequalities among citizens in their capacities and opportunities for participating as political equals in governing the state’  (Dahl, 1985: 55). The distribution of wealth and power in Southeast Asian societies has been profoundly shaped by colonial legacies, Cold War strategies and especially state-led economic development. Persistent state patronage has produced dominant capitalist classes which have never needed to develop liberal ideology or alliances with the lower orders to secure their interests, and are thus statist, illiberal and often predatory in nature (Bellin, 2000; Rodan et al., 2006b). Conversely, authoritarian measures have been used to suppress and disorganise workers and peasants, the effect of which has been compounded by globalisation’s negative impact on the bargaining position of labour (Hadiz, 2004; Deyo, 2006). Economic development has generated professional middle classes in many regional countries, but their dependence on the state for generating employment and providing security from the lower orders means that only a small, radical fraction of this class has been prepared to challenge the status quo (Robison and Goodman, 1996; Rodan, 1996; Jones, 1998). This fraction has tended to exercise influence only during crises when the oligarchic elite fragments (Loh, 2008). The balance of power between social forces thus favours the interests of illiberal, developmentalist elites. This helps explain, for instance, Caballero-Anthony’s findings about the securitisation of poverty.
	Socio-political groups vary not only in their interests, ideology and socio-economic power, but also in terms of their access to state power. As Jessop (2008) argues, following Poulantzas (1976), states are never neutral apparatuses offering identical opportunities for control to all social groups; rather, they exhibit an inherent ‘strategic selectivity’ which marginalise some interests while advancing others. Over time, states are organised so as to systematically favour dominant forces’ interests, through the interpenetration of state apparatuses with powerful social groups, such that state power ‘reflects and essentially underpins the prevailing hierarchies of power embodied in the social order’ (Hewison et al., 1993: 6). Given the nature of region’s social orders sketched above, this means that ‘one of the defining features of the political economy of Southeast Asia is the highly instrumental nature of capitalist control of state power’ (Rodan et al., 2006a: 25). However, Jessop also emphasises that different parts of state apparatuses may be captured by or interpenetrated with rival social groups, such that social conflict also plays out within states themselves. States and their policies thus have no necessary coherence. This helps to explain the disjuncture between ASEAN states’ rhetorical commitments and actual practice. Some state officials – notably those in the technocracies of foreign ministries who are embedded within global communities of foreign policy apparatchiks and perhaps interface with scholars favouring broader security agendas in various ‘Track Two’ institutions – may genuinely wish to securitise particular issues and produce commensurate discourse. However, they might have little leverage over those parts of the state apparatus tasked with devising or implementing solutions, which may be linked to social forces with little interest in tackling the problem, constraining their colleagues from agreeing to do so. Even when Ccommitments are made to address the issue, they may consequently, therefore, involve little more than international posturing, being made in full knowledge that implementation is impossible.
	We can concretise this understanding of state power in Southeast Asia and its implications for security policy using a few examples. In most regional states, the balance of social and economic power allows cartels of politico-business elites to capture state power using a combination of coercion, patronage and bribery. Offices and ministries are apportioned as the spoils of power and milked to provide pecuniary benefits for their incumbents and their allies. This state capture has both indirect and direct consequence for security policy. Indirectly, it means that the basic scope of security policy is set by the interests of oligarchic elites. This explains why, as one analyst wryly remarks, ‘nothing drives government policy in Southeast Asia like the smell of money’ (Ott, 1998: 73). More directly, it can involve state power being used instrumentally by specific business interests. An obvious example is tycoon-turned-politician Thaksin Shinawatra, who was Thailand’s foreign minister in the mid-1990s and prime minister from 2001 to 2006. Thaksin’s firm, ShinCorp, was directly implicated, alongside officers of Thailand’s National Security Council, in a bungled attempt to overthrow the Cambodian government in 1994, designed to advance the business interests of Thaksin and his allies (Jones, 2010: 490). Thaksin also used his ministerial positions to acquire lucrative contracts for ShinCorp’s subsidiary, Sattel, in Burma, and thus pursued a very friendly foreign policy towards that country, legitimised with reference to ‘non-interference’ (Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 213; McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 54-55). 
	Constellations of social and economic power also operate as practical constraints on security policy even when oligarchs do not control governments directly. There are, as mentioned above, various forces contesting corruption, illiberalism and oligarchic rule in many Southeast Asian societies. One of these forces – Thailand’s Democrat Party, which is largely based in Bangkok’s middle classes – came to power after the 1997 Asian financial crisis to replace the discredited incumbent government, and embarked on an ambitious programme of neoliberalising reforms. However, they recognised that ‘establishment interests’ would continue to exercise powerful constraints on Thailand’s foreign and security policies. As the new foreign minister explained, while Democrat supporters wanted

Thailand to move more quickly and aggressively in pressing for greater democracy and human rights in the region... there are also others, including border business interests and some in the bureaucracy, who stand to lose out from such a course of action. The task of balancing the interests between the more progressive and entrenched establishment interests is a delicate one. Foreign policy cannot get ahead of social factors. Foreign policy… must reflect the existing social structure altogether. If foreign policy is internally contradictory, the benefits gained would fall short of their potential. For example, if our policy of promoting human rights and democracy hurts the interests of our traders along the border, the policy will encounter domestic political resistance and be ultimately unsustainable (Surin 1998).

‘Social structure’ operates as a constraint on official policy because groups within and beyond the state may have the capacity to resist or overturn the implementation of official government policy in defence of their own interests. In the early 1990s, the United Nations (UN) was trying to settle the long-running Cambodian civil war, in which Thailand had long been fuelling. However, Tthe Khmer Rouge were refusing to disarm, undermining the peace process,. and tThe UN thus embargoed trade with Cambodia in petroleum, timber and gems in order to cut off the Khmer Rouge’s supplies of fuel and funds. Thailand’s Democrat-led coalition government pledged to cooperate fully with the embargo. However, this policy was resisted by political, military and business leaders who profited from the international black market trade in arms, gems, and timber mediated through the Khmer Rouge. They continued these activities, with police and military units being regularly observed helping to transport goods to the Khmer Rouge. Naturally, this severely undermined Bangkok’s official policy (Rungswasdisab, 2006: 103-111). 
	The social constitution of state power is thus vital to our understanding of security policy. It helps set limits to what will be defined as a ‘threat’ and how states will actually respond in practice. The ‘social conflict’ analysis described above goes beyond securitisation theory by unpacking the state and specifying the forces whose struggles actually determine the content and practice of security policy. This approach also goes further than the ubiquitous yet vague references made to ‘regime security’ in literature on Southeast Asia. Security policy is not simply driven by the desire of small numbers of state elites to remain in power, but by the broader constellation of interests that these elites serve and whose agency in fact constitutes particular forms of state and regime, and by struggles both within such coalitions, and between these coalitions and their opponents.  Although this argument has been advanced in relation to the specific nature state power in Southeast Asia, the theoretical and analytical approach is universally applicable. For example, it is arguably impossible to comprehend US policy towards Latin America during much of the Cold War without taking into account the interests and influence of corporations like the United Fruit Company. The next section illustrates the argument further through an extended case study of regional policies towards Burma, which traces these policies to the constellations of power and interests underpinning ASEAN states.


3. Regional Policies on Burma

Burma’s military regime, which stands accused of repeated human rights abuses and of generating serious transnational security threats, has become a major international political issue over the last two decades. Liberal critics in the West and Southeast Asia often criticise ASEAN for tolerating rather than dealing forcefully with the threats the Burmese regime creates to regional security. The Association’s non-interference principle is often cited to explain this reaction. In reality, ASEAN states have frequently violated non-interference when dealing with Burma. They have, for example, increasingly criticised the repression of opposition forces and have repeatedly sought a role to play in Burma’s process of ‘national reconciliation’ (Jones, 2008). ‘Non-interference’ is thus a weak explanation for their failure to respond to Burma as a security threat. Analysing how policy is embedded in broader processes and power relations at the national level provides a better guide to state behaviour. First, it shows that oligarchic business interests, in particular, shape the basic contours of Southeast Asian states’ policies towards Burma. Some things which appear as ‘transnational security threats’ to the region’s liberal Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and political parties are actually seen as lucrative opportunities by more powerful oligarchic forces. Parts of state apparatuses are even directly involved in exploiting these opportunities. Secondly, we can examine how social conflict transforms security policy and the state. When liberalising forces took control of the Thai government in 1997, they adopted a much more hostile policy towards Burma, identifying transnational flows as security threats, and began reconfiguring the state to act against them. However, this was reversed when oligarchic forces recaptured the state. Thirdly, we can explore how regional states deal with the dilemmas created when gaps emerge between the policies generated by oligarchic domination and the demands of important foreign states. Several regional states have created more space for liberal critics to attack Burma, yet the risk of this being used for domestic purposes means that the space is tightly policed.

‘Threats’ as Oligarchic Opportunities
Dominant oligarchic interests have been very influential in setting the basic contours of regional policies on Burma. While liberal political parties and civil society groups see transnational flows from Burma, such as refugees, as a challenge to regional security, the region’s business oligarchs see them as a commodity to be exploited and thus refuse to ‘securitise’ them.
Liberal critics in the West and in Southeast Asia have identified various transnational flows produced by military rule in Burma as threats to international security, including high incidences of communicable diseases like HIV/AIDS, forced and illegal migration, and exports of illegal narcotics. An estimated 700,000 Burmese refugees reside in neighbouring countries, as many as two million illegal Burmese migrants live in Thailand, and up to 500,000 are in Malaysia (DLA Piper, 2005: 56; IOM, 2008). Burma exported an estimated $123m-worth of opium in 2008, and around 700m methamphetamine tablets as recently as 2004 (UNODC, 2008: 43; Devaney et al., 2005: 48). Drug addiction and closely correlated HIV-infection rates in neighbouring countries have steadily grown. ASEAN itself has discursively ‘securitised’ a number of related issues, declaring in 2000 the goal of a ‘drug-free ASEAN’ by 2015, issuing a declaration on the protection of migrants in 2005, and expanding regional cooperation to include the combating of HIV/AIDS and transnational crime. However, some Southeast Asian NGOs and liberal politicians argue that this response is merely rhetorical and ineffective. For them, these problems constitute security threats requiring robust, interventionist measures by the United Nations, ASEAN, and/or other powers like China and India (see, e.g., www.altsean.org; www.aseanmp.org). 
The disjuncture between critical interpretations of these threats, ASEAN’s official security discourse, and what regional states actually do in practice, can be explained via the nature of state power in Southeast Asia. Rather than dealing with Burma forcefully as a security threat, ASEAN governments have instead pursued a policy of ‘constructive engagement’. Launched in the early 1990s, this policy aimed to transcend the frosty relations of the Cold War era to facilitate trade and investment, encourage pro-market reforms and minimise China’s influence in Burma. Although the policy was initially devised by Thai foreign ministry officials with the explicit goal of promoting reforms in Burma, in practice the contours of constructive engagement were principally set by the requirements of ASEAN’s businesses classes. The Burmese and Indochinese markets were seen as lucrative destinations for accumulated investment capital and a crucial source of raw materials to replace supplies exhausted by ASEAN’s long economic boom. The displacement of Thailand’s military regime in 1988 by an elected government comprising leading business oligarchs paved the way for these interests to be prioritised in foreign and security policy and for Bangkok to try to turn neighbouring ‘battlefields into marketplaces’ (Jones, 2008: 273-275). 
Rapprochement with Burma was pioneered by well-connected senior military officers and state-linked business elites looking to expand their corporate interests into Burma. Many of them were or became involved in politics, like General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who became Thailand’s prime minister in 1996. Thai politico-business elites were followed by Malaysian investors, including the state oil company, Petronas, which sank $587m into 25 projects in Burma by 2001, and many Suharto cronies, who invested similar sums. These intimate connections between state and business elites ensured a cautious, non-confrontational approach towards the military regime. The political and economic reforms promoted by neighbouring states as part of ‘constructive engagement’ were limited to those compatible with this agenda and were commensurate with regional elites’ own illiberal styles of domestic governance (Jones, 2008: 273-274, 278). 
	Recognising the social basis of constructive engagement enables us to understand why the negative externalities of military rule in Burma are apparently accepted with such equanimity by neighbouring states. The vast numbers of Burmese refugees and migrants in Malaysia and Thailand, for example, are widely seen by business leaders not as a security risk but as a source of cheap, exploitable labour. Malaysia’s economy depends heavily on foreign labour, with over two million legal and up to a million illegal workers (perhaps half of them Burmese) supplementing the 11.3m-strong domestic workforce. NGO leaders allege that Burmese migrant workers were used to construct the federal capital at Putrajaya, and a recent investigation even alleged the direct involvement of senior state officials in the trafficking of Burmese migrants across the Thai border (Jones, 2008: 285; US Congress, 2009). 
Thai manufacturing, agriculture and fishing is also dependent on the exploitation of predominantly Burmese migrants. The International Labour Organisation estimates that migrant labour produces up to 6.2 per cent of Thailand’s GDP, or $11bn per year (Martin, 2007). As in Malaysia, elements of the Thai state, whatever official government policy may be, are interpenetrated or identical with the forces enriching themselves through such exploitation. Parts of the central security apparatus may harbour genuine ‘security’ concerns about Burmese migrants, but are able to impose their will only sporadically through periodic clampdowns and expulsions. According to Kraisak Choonhavan (2008), the Democrat party’s deputy leader, the National Security Council believes that up to five million Burmese migrants live in Thailand and worries they may soon ‘explode with discontentment and anger’. Yet northern businessmen are currently able to quash strikes by ‘hir[ing] policemen to do the job of suppression’. The non-governmental Labour Rights Protection Network also alleges the involvement of Thai soldiers in people-trafficking (Ellgee, 2009). Senior military officers and their allies on both sides of the border have long been accused of involvement in the black-market trade in drugs, arms and other goods, and Thai army units have even reportedly been bribed by both the Burmese government and rebel groups to intervene in battles across the border (Lintner, 1999; Maung, 2001: 58, 50-52). 
The social, economic and political dominance of illiberal business interests, and their interpenetration with state apparatuses, thus produces an approach towards Burma which tolerates, exploits, or even welcomes, rather than securitising, the transnational flows produced by military rule.

Social Conflict Reshapes Security Policy and States
Illiberal business interests have not always been able to simply impose their interests upon the state. Occasionally, especially in moments of crisis, liberalising, middle-class forces may impose their preferences as government policy. However, due to the interpenetration of state apparatuses with powerful interests opposed to their agenda, liberalisers often face significant resistance both inside and outside the state. Consequently, they are often compelled to reorganise state apparatuses to pursue their goals. However, the political economy of the region is so weighted against liberalising political parties that they are often unable to hold power for long, except in alliance with oligarchic groups.
The opponents of constructive engagement tend to be drawn from the liberal section of the middle class, which derives little benefit from the policy and has long been hostile to the Burmese regime. However, because of their subordinate position, liberals have struggled to impose their reading of the situation onto their respective states. The most forceful attempt to do so occurred under the Democrat government from 1997-2001. Following repeated seizures of Thai personnel and installations by Burmese dissidents in late 1999 and early 2000, the government sealed the border and cracked down on Burmese migrant workers, severely damaging northern business interests (Haacke, 2006: 8). The government also reorganised the state apparatus, promoting anti-Burmese reformers to key positions in the army. Its new chief, General Surayud, identified Burmese drugs as the principal threat to Thailand’s security in January 2000, and by May, the deputy foreign minister had reportedly backed military raids on drugs factories inside Burma, blasting the regime for sheltering narco-traffickers. Surayud endorsed the idea the following month, and armed clashes between the two countries’ armies began along the border (Tasker and Crispin, 2000; Kavi Chongkittavorn, 2001: 125). The Democrats also tried to dilute ASEAN’s non-interference principle, pressing for ASEAN to send a troika of foreign ministers to berate Burma. Outraged oligarchs condemned this ruinous deterioration in bilateral relations, trying to topple Chuan’s administration in a parliamentary no-confidence motion (Associated Press, 1999). 
Despite Surin’s warning about the necessity of government policy reflecting the ‘social structure’ (Surin, 1998), the Democrats over-reached the government’s wider social limitations. They were soundly defeated by Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party at the 2001 elections, which restored both the oligarchic domination of Thai politics and business as usual with Burma. Thaksin promoted leading Thai oligarchs to cabinet positions, following the Thai Chamber of Commerce’s advice to make General Chavalit defence minister and use him to improve bilateral relations (Snitwongse, 2001: 201). Thaksin cracked down on Burmese dissidents inside Thailand, renounced Thailand’s policy of sponsoring Burmese rebel groups to create a ‘buffer zone’ along the border, and drastically reorganised the state apparatus, sidelining anti-Burmese reformers in the army and installing his own cronies (McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 131-151; Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 184-187). Burma reopened the border to trade and reactivated fishing concessions, while Thai government funds were used to facilitate new investments in Burma, with Chavalit’s allies and Thaksin himself rushing to exploit fresh opportunities (Moncrief and Khiel, 2002; McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 54-55). The Thaksin government also ended the Democrats’ attack on Burma’s sovereignty, emphasising ‘non-interference’ to justify their new policy. Meanwhile, Thaksin harnessed public concern about narcotics not to attack Burma, but to wage a domestic ‘war on drugs’ in which over 2,700 people were extra-judicially killed, many of them allegedly local ‘godfathers’ who had resisted incorporation into TRT networks (McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 227). Thaksin only took a critical line towards Burma when a lucrative free trade deal with the US was threatened in the wake of an anti-opposition crackdown by the junta in 2003 (Jones, 2008: 279).
These dramatic reversals in policy, and the reconfigurations of the state which accompanied them, clearly cannot be explained without reference to Thailand’s domestic social conflict. Moreover, it is this conflict which determines the state’s relationship to ASEAN’s non-interference principle, rather than the norm which determines state behaviour.

The Dilemmas of Strategic Liberalisation
Challenges to business-friendly policies towards Burma do not merely emanate from the domestic field, however. Particularly since a resurgence of hard-liners in the Burmese regime since 2003, Western states have also applied a great deal of pressure on ASEAN. This has imperilled the external economic and political relationships from which dominant forces benefit. Several Southeast Asian states have therefore allowed more space for domestic critics of Burma, to enhance their standing in Western capitals. However, the risk of this space being exploited to demand domestic reforms means that it is often tightly policed. This illustrates that the degree of liberalisation in foreign and security policies remains subject to broader structural constraints.
	The widening of domestic space is clearest in the Philippines and Indonesia. Since the demise of the Suharto regime and its significant business interests in Burma, dominant groups in these two states have had little interest in defending the Burmese regime. Indeed, Indonesian elites have found playing up their liberal-democratic image a useful way of regaining Western aid in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, and of restating Jakarta’s supposed right to lead ASEAN (Emmerson, 2006; Rüland, 2009). Indonesian legislators are thus happy to criticise military rule in Burma, and have been at the forefront of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC), which campaigns for intervention in Burma. However, because many legislators are drawn from the old elite and benefit from widespread corruption, they have refused to support a similar caucus on ‘good governance’. This shows that liberalising forces are not automatically unleashed by democratisation, but remain subject to broader structural constraints on state power (Jones, 2009: 398-400).
More authoritarian regimes like those in Cambodia, Singapore and Malaysia have also granted space to critics of Burma from within their own parliaments to help burnish their ‘democratic’ credentials and distance themselves from the junta. However, the risk that liberalising opposition parties might use this space to pursue a domestic agenda means that this space remains constrained and policed. Singapore, for instance, has strongly encouraged the AIPMC, but arrested opposition politicians and protest groups for staging their own independent demonstrations against Burma. Similarly, the Malaysian government has ensured that AIPMC legislators’ attacks on Burma do not go so far as to damage state-linked economic interests. They were allowed, for example, to criticise the regime in parliament, but not to pass a resolution calling for sanctions. As an opposition parliamentarian explains, since ‘some of the MPs, or the government-linked corporations, like Petronas’ retain investments in Burma, ‘we can’t call for sanctions because this will hurt the investors from Malaysia’ (Kok, 2008). Consequently, even when political space is strategically relaxed, dominant forces can take steps to constrain its use, and entrenched political economy relationships still operate as a background constraint. 
The ‘social conflict’ approach to analysing regional security policies has revealed why Southeast Asian states seem surprisingly indulgent of Burma. What appears as a ‘threat’ to some social groups may be a lucrative opportunity for others. What matters is less the nature and magnitude of the material flows across borders, but rather their relationship to the interests, ideologies and strategies of key social forces, and the power relations between these forces.  


4. Implications for other issues: across and upon borders

The approach developed above can potentially help us understand a wide range of ‘security’ issues. Indeed, it can help shed light on why a region with many so-called ‘non-traditional’ security threats elicits so little practical cooperation to tackle these threats: the social forces that benefit from or even produce these threats may be too deeply entrenched, or the conflicts among them too severe, to permit such cooperation. This section indicates how the framework could be applied to analyse environmental governance and border conflicts. 
	Environmental degradation is widespread in Southeast Asia, and occasionally it is securitised. In particular, the annual ‘haze’ (smog) arising from Indonesian forest fires has become a major political issue. In the worst year, 1997, the haze had a greater impact than the Exxon Valdez disaster, affecting the health of 70m people and costing an estimated $4.5bn (Glover and Jessup, 1999). As with the Burma issue, this seems this is depicted by many critical analysts, political leaders and particularly environmentalist NGOs as an objective ‘threat’ requiring decisive action, and certainly environmentalist NGOs make such claims. ASEAN states, which had been discussing environmental issues since 1990, also appeared to securitise the issue in theira regional agreement on haze in 2003. However, this agreement remains unratified by the Indonesian parliament, and therefore offers no basis for Malaysia and Singapore, the worst-affected countries, to take action. The 2006 haze was almost as severe as that in 1997, suggesting that this problem is far from resolved.
The barrier to effective cooperation against this ‘threat’ is not, as IR scholars would again have it, ASEAN’s non-interference principle. Rather, as Tay (2009: 233) explains, it is ‘certain agro-industrial firms, ambitious politicians, and venal officials who mutually benefit from cheaply burning off land to plant cash crops’ in Indonesia, and the ‘corruption and collusion between some of the large plantation firms that use fire and the officials who are supposed to control and suppress such illegal acts’ (see also Dauvergne, 1998; Ross, 2001; Smith et al., 2003). The Indonesian military – and perhaps the police – relies on illegal activities, including logging, to raise at least half of its operational costs, and powerful agri-business magnates are able to dominate state institutions and corrupt judicial outcomes at the local and even national levels (International Crisis Group, 2001; Matthew and Van Gelder, 2002). It is thus unsurprising that the ASEAN haze agreement remains unratified and nolittle decisive action has been taken by the Indonesian national government against polluters.
Why are the Singaporean and Malaysian governments reluctant to take unilateral action against haze producers inside Indonesia? Partly, they are doubtless afraid of evoking a predictablye, hostile response from the Indonesian state. However, they may also wish to avoid other repercussions that are not so clearly apparent.  Indonesian ministers have often called for Malaysia and Singapore, as the main export destinations for illegal timber, to help stem unlawful logging in Indonesia. Tay dismisses this as merely diversionary. However, this overlooks the fact that key agri-businesses involved in slash-and-burn operations, like Asia-Pacific Resources International Holdings Ltd (APRIL), are actually headquartered in Singapore and operate processing facilities in Malaysian Borneo (Matthew and Van Gelder, 2002: 14-15). Illegally imported Indonesia logs reportedly constitute the vast majority of timber processed in Malaysian factories (Asia Times Online, 2003), and the Malaysian forestry industry is notoriously entangled with local political elites who dispense concessions in exchange for campaign finance contributions (Leigh, 1998). APRIL is just one of the many Indonesian businesses, led by one of the ethnic Chinese magnates who dominate the regional economy, which benefited hugely from state patronage under Suharto before relocating to Singapore to escape financial reckoning during the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Studwell, 2007: esp. 163-167). It reminds us that a full explanation of transboundary ‘security’ issues is rarely complete without taking into account the complex and evolving transnational organisation of economic, social and political power. 
The ‘social conflict’ approach may also help in analysing more ‘traditional’ security issues, such as border disputes. Take, for example, the Thai-Cambodian border conflict, which has been raging since July 2008 and has involved vitriolic diplomatic exchanges, repeated incursions of Thai forces into Cambodia, and even armed clashes, killing nine soldiers. Ostensibly, the dispute concerns a few square miles of scrubland adjacent to the Preah Vihear temple, which was granted to Cambodia by an International Court of Justice ruling in 1962. In fact, the conflict has virtually nothing to do with territory or border ‘security’ at all; its roots lie firmly in Thailand’s domestic social conflicts.
The dispute emerged as part of an effort to topple the Thai government in 2008. The government was led by the People’s Power Party (PPP), which won a plurality of votes in the first democratic elections following the military coup that overthrew the Thaksin government in 2006. The TRT had been forcibly disbanded but had simply reconstituted itself as the PPP and quickly seized power thanks to continued support from the rural poor. Consequently, the same forces that had opposed Thaksin in 2006 now lined up against the PPP. This alliance spanned the middle classes, big businessmen disgruntled at Thaksin’s monopolisation of lucrative opportunities, and the palace network, including politico-business and military and bureaucratic elites who resented Thaksin’s growing encroachment on their turf (Connors and Hewison, 2008). 
These forces, led in parliament by the Democrats, began agitating against the government in a way which directly precipitated conflict with Cambodia. Using courts stuffed with anti-Thaksin judges during the military interregnum, they launched a series of highly-politicised lawsuits against the PPP. In a so-called ‘judicial coup’, the courts first ruled that the PPP must disband due to electoral irregularities. The PPP simply reconstituted itself as Puea Thai and carried on. The courts then targeted individual ministers for prosecution, forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Samak Sundraravej over the hosting of a television cookery show. The border dispute began when Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama supported Cambodia’s bid for UNESCO recognition for Preah Vihear as a world heritage site. Democrat legislators (falsely) claimed that the government had thereby unconstitutionally alienated Thai territory, initiating another lawsuit. The constitutional court ruled in favour of the Democrat suit. Noppadon was forced to resign, and the government had to send politically unreliable troops to the border. Clashes were then inevitable. 





This paper has argued that the securitisation approach, despite its ubiquitous application, struggles to explain some key issues in security studies, notably why gaps exist between supposedly all-important security discourse and the actual practice of security policy, and why some security issues get securitised and governed in particular ways while others do not. To answer these questions requires us to go beyond securitisation, to go further in disaggregating the state than CS theorists have hitherto ventured. I have argued that understanding the way in which states deal with international security issues is impossible without exploring their relationship to the strategies and interests of important societal groups. Different social forces’ interests, ideologies and strategies lead them to relate differently to potential security issues, and thus potentially to push for divergent responses. In addition, powerful forces are often able to either directly capture or indirectly impose their wishes on the state, or organise themselves in ways that frustrate policy implementation or bend it to their interests. Thus, what emerges in practice is a function of struggle between socio-political coalitions, both outside and within states. It may very often depart from the official security discourse that CS theorists privilege so heavily.  While the CS approach may remain partially useful in describing the way in which political actors rhetorically frame issues as matters of security, to assess why they do so and what real effect this will have on policy requires going well beyond securitisation, to disaggregate the state and identify the social conflict and political economy relationships affecting the exercise of state power.
	This ‘social conflict’ perspective helps us to understand why many security issues appear so intractable and why states seem so reluctant to take action or incapable of doing so. Many security problems are intractable precisely because they are rooted in obdurate social conflicts, or because they relate to particularly entrenched interests. To ignore such relationships inevitably produces naïve, technocratic policy prescriptions that have no realistic chance of being adopted, in the short term at least, given the social constraints faced by governments. Governments and officials often appear reluctant to tackle issues identified as security problems precisely because they are either fearful of exacerbating domestic conflicts, incapable of successfully taking on entrenched interests, or are directly or indirectly implicated in these problems themselves. 
This in turn helps to explain why it is often so difficult to get states to sign up to instruments of global governance or to meet their obligations under such instruments. Take, for example, environmental governance, which is an increasingly important issue on the global security agenda and the focus of growing numbers of multilateral treaties and institutions. Issues like climate change, air pollution, forest depletion and species extinction are increasingly acknowledged in Southeast Asia’s regional security discourse. However, the actual formulation and implementation of policies is filtered through dominant domestic interests. Regional states have long been in league with rapacious corporate interests, embracing porous borders and pursuing deregulation in neighbouring territories to help shift environmental exploitation into spaces where political mobilisation around green issues is less effective (Pangsapa and Smith, 2008). States are also reluctant to join and implement global accords around these issues because natural resources are often exploited by networks directly connected to politico-security elites who benefit from off-budget revenues and other collusive relationships (Talbott and Brown, 1998; Smith et al., 2003). To the extent that environmental governance does occur it is likely to take an ‘authoritarian’ form which will reinforce dominant interests (Beeson, 2010). 
However, this is not simply a counsel of despair, because security policy is not simply an unfettered expression of the interests of dominant forces. Rather, states and their policies are contingent outcomes of struggles for power and control. As Thailand’s relations with Burma and Cambodia show, social conflict can generate dramatic shifts in policy as competing groups reorganise the state to promote their ideologies and interests. The future of security policy in Southeast Asia will thus depend on the ongoing social, economic and political transformation of the region. Liberalising middle-class opposition movements are increasingly influential in states like Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, making it difficult for dominant groups to simply impose their whims upon the state. They are also beginning to organise themselves regionally through bodies like the AIPMC and the ASEAN People’s Forum. New institutions and regional commitments to democracy and ‘good governance’ partly testify to their influence. 
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